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REDUCTION TO PRACTICE,
EXPERIMENTAL USE, AND THE "ON
SALE" AND "PUBLIC USE" BARS TO
PATENTABILITYt
WILLIAM C. RooKLmGE*
W. GERARD VON HOFFMANN, III**
Professor William Robinson introduced his 1890 treatise on
patent law with the observation that:
[A] period had at last been reached when the Law of Patents
could be successfully treated as a department of jurisprudence
whose doctrines were derived by logical processes from estab-
lished principles, and not as a mere body of legislative enact-
ments verbally interpreted by the decisions of the courts ....
[W]henever questions of Patent Law are now presented to our
courts the factors of the problem lie before them, certain and in-
telligible, requiring only careful distinctions and accurate reason-
ing to attain impregnable results.1
If patent law had indeed achieved jurisprudential stability in 1890,
it strayed far from such stability over the next ninety years. Con-
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gress acted to return the stability in 1982 by enacting the Federal
Courts Improvement Act,2 which created the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and, effective October 1, 1982,
transferred to that court the jurisdiction of the regional circuit
courts of appeals over appeals from district court cases "arising
under" the patent laws.'
One of the goals of Congress in giving the Federal Circuit ju-
risdiction over patent cases was to impart uniformity and certainty
in the jurisprudence of patent law.4 Six years later, intercircuit
conflicts having been eliminated, the prevailing view is that the
Federal Circuit has been generally successful in achieving reasona-
ble uniformity and certainty within its own precedents.5 One area
where that belief is not so widely held, however, is in cases dealing
with the "public use" and "on sale" bars.
The United States Constitution grants to Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to .. . [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their ...
Discoveries." 6 Congress exercised that power by establishing our
patent system.7 Through that system the Patent and Trademark
Office grants to an inventor an exclusive right in his invention in
exchange for an enabling public disclosure of the invention.' The
inventor, however, must comply with the conditions prescribed by
Congress in order to obtain a valid patent." One of these conditions
2 Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982)). The
Federal Circuit has subsequently rejected the regional circuits' views on such diverse mat-
ters as "synergism," patents as "monopolies," and the "patent standard" for preliminary
injunctions.
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982). Under section 1295 (a)(1), the court has jurisdiction
over appeals from district court decisions if the district court's jurisdiction was based, in
whole or in part, on that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982) which grants district courts
jurisdiction over cases "arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents." Id. § 1338
(a).
. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 11, 15-16; H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1981).
See, e.g., AIPLA FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CoMM., FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT
LAw DECISIONs 254 (1986).
6 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
As a general rule, the patent laws are codified under title 35 of the United States
Code. For jurisdictional purposes, however, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the patent
laws more broadly. See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490,
1494-95 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that 16 U.S.C. § 831(r) is an "Act of Congress relating to
patents"), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 26 (1987).
8 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-12, 151-53 (1982).
1 See Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96-97 (1876); Shaw v. Cooper,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833).
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is that the invention cannot have been placed "in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States."10 This provision, sec-
tion 102(b) of title 35 of the United States Code, contains two sep-
arate but interrelated conditions, known as the "public use" and
"on sale" bars to patentability.
Pre-1982 conventional wisdom was that application of the
"public use" and "on sale" bars required that the invention reach a
particular stage of development, known as reduction to practice, at
the time of the activity in order for that activity to raise either bar.
The same conventional wisdom was that there was an "experimen-
tal use" exception to the "public use" and "on sale" bars. As an
exception, experimental use was activity that would otherwise be a
bar but for the intent of the inventor. Experimental use, therefore,
involved inventions that had reached the stage of development
necessary to implicate the bar, namely reduction to practice.
The Federal Circuit has, at least in part, rejected that under-
standing of the "public use" and "on sale" bars. In TP Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc.," the court reasoned
that rather than being an exception, experimental use negates the
"public use" and "on sale" bars. Similarly, in UMC Electronics Co.
v. United States,2 the court rejected the proposition that applica-
tion of the "on sale" bar required that the invention be reduced to
practice. In both TP Laboratories and UMC Electronics, the court
looked to early Supreme Court cases and policy considerations un-
derlying the bars.
After reviewing these early cases and policies, as well as the
cases of the regional circuits and the Federal Circuit, this Article
will conclude that the Federal Circuit has rejected the regional cir-
cuits' entire understanding of the "public use" and "on sale" bars
as related to experimental use and reduction to practice.
Part I of this Article will recount the brief legislative history of
the bars, pointing out that Congress offered no guidance on the
issues of experimental use and reduction to practice as applied to
the "on sale" and "public use" bars. Consequently, this area of the
law is entirely judge-made.
Part II will discuss the relationship between reduction to prac-
'0 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
11 724 F.2d 965, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
12 816 F.2d 647, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748
(1988).
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tice and two older terms of art in patent law necessary to under-
stand the Supreme Court cases on the subject: "completion" and
"perfection." These terms were used by the Supreme Court in its
nineteenth century opinions analyzing the "on sale" and "public
use" bars. Analysis of early cases and commentators will show that
"completion" and "perfection" are synonyms for a state of devel-
opment of an invention that is marked by the event of reduction to
practice.
Part III of this Article will review the Supreme Court prece-
dents and conclude that the Court assumed that application of the
bars did not require a completed invention, that completion of an
invention ended experimental use, and that experimental use was
not an exception to the operation of the bars, but was a separate
stage of development which was necessarily ended by a completion
of the invention. Because the Court used "completion" to mean
reduction to practice, Part III will conclude that the Supreme
Court assumed that operation of the bars did not require reduction
to practice, and that reduction to practice ended experimental use.
Experimental use of the kind that would negate the bars, in the
eyes of the Supreme Court, was use for the purpose of reducing the
invention to practice.
This Article will then, in Part IV, recount how the regional
circuit courts of appeals and the district courts required a reduc-
tion to practice before conduct would give rise to a section 102(b)
bar, but will point out that these courts adhered to that require-
ment in name only. Part IV will also trace the development of a
split of authority among the lower courts and the commentators on
whether reduction to practice ends experimental use.
Part V will reveal that the same kind of disagreement found in
the regional circuits is reflected in the opinions of the Federal Cir-
cuit. Part V will review Federal Circuit cases holding that reduc-
tion to practice is not required for application of the bars, and
cases implying that it is, as well as cases stating that experimental
use can and cannot extend beyond reduction to practice. Notwith-
standing these differing pronouncements by the Federal Circuit,
the analytical approach consistently used by that court has been to
resort to the policies underlying the pertinent statutory bar.
Utilizing the Federal Circuit's approach, this Article will in
Part VI analyze the policies underlying the "on sale" and "public
use" bars. Part VI will conclude that those policies render each
proposition of the Supreme Court's analytical framework a truism:
[Vol. 63:1
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application of neither bar requires reduction to practice, reduction
to practice ends experimental use, and experimental use is con-
fined to activities for the purpose of reducing the invention to
practice.
From the policies underlying the "on sale" and "public use"
bars, Part VII will propose a simple test for each bar, a test incor-
porating these policies and the analytical framework of the Su-
preme Court's early cases.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In the first United States Patent Statute, Congress authorized
the grant of a patent to anyone who invented something "not
before known or used."13 In the 1836 Patent Act, Congress enacted
an "on sale" and "public use" bar provision.14 The bars were not
qualified by any grace period-the inventor had to file his patent
application before placing the invention "on sale" or in "public
use." Three years later, Congress added a two-year grace period to
the bar, granting inventors two years in which to apply for a patent
after placing the invention "on sale" or in "public use."' 5
The "on sale" and "public use" provision of the statute re-
mained substantially the same for one hundred years, until 1939,
when Congress reduced the two-year grace period to one year.' 6
" See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109.
" See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. The Patent Act of 1836 pro-
vided in pertinent part:
[A]ny person or persons having discovered or invented any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or
used by others before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not, at the
time of his application for a patent, in public use or on sale, with his consent or
allowance, as the inventor or discoverer; and shall desire to obtain an exclusive
property therein, may make application in writing to the Commissioner of Pat-
ents, expressing such desire, and the Commissioner, on due proceedings had, may
grant a patent therefor.
Id.
15 See Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354. The 1839 Act provided in perti-
nent part-
[N]o patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of such purchase, sale, or use
prior to the application for a patent as aforesaid, except on proof ... that such
purchase, sale, or prior use has been for more than two years prior to such appli-
cation for a patent.
Id.
Is See Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212, 1212. Such Act provided in
pertinent part:
That sections 4886... of the Revised Statutes... be amended by striking out the
1988l
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The 1939 provision was carried over virtually unchanged into the
1952 recodification of the patent laws as section 102(b).
The only congressional comment on experimental use came
well after the doctrine had been established by the courts. In the
reports accompanying the 1939 Patent Act, Congress observed that
"[t]he law thus permits an inventor, after his invention is fully
completed, to make the invention known to the public for a period
of two years before filing his application for patent."17 This view
may have stemmed from Andrews v. Hovey,"'8 where the Court ob-
served that the object of the bars "was to require the inventor to
see to it that he filed his application within two years from the
completion of his invention." 9 Nevertheless, this single comment,
reflecting only an opinion on what the law was in 1939, provides no
insight into legislative intent in enacting the "on sale" and "public
use" bars over one-hundred years earlier.
words "two years" wherever they appear in said sections and substituting therefor
the words "one year."
Id.
The statute had been revised in the Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201, to
read as follows:
That any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, not known or used by others in this country, and not patented, or de-
scribed in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his inven-
tion or discovery thereof, and not in public use or on sale for more than two years
prior to his application, unless the same is proved to have been abandoned, may,
upon payment of the duty required by law, and other due proceedings had, obtain
a patent therefor.
Id.
This section was codified as Revised Statute § 4886 in 1874. Then in 1897, Congress
amended the section to read as follows:
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements
thereof, not known or used by others in this country, before his invention or dis-
covery thereof, and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or
any foreign country, before his invention or discovery thereof, or more than two
years prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in this country for
more than two years prior to his application, unless the same is proved to have
been abandoned, may, upon payment of the fees required by law, and other due
proceedings had, obtain a patent therefor.
Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692, 692.
'7 S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1939). At that time, the statutory grace period was two years. Congress reduced that
period to one year in 1939. Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212, 1212.
18 123 U.S. 267 (1887).
19 Id. at 274.
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II. TERMINOLOGY
Congress has never defined what constitutes placing an inven-
tion "on sale" or in "public use." Consequently, the courts have
struggled in applying the bars to commercial and public activities
for "experimental" purposes. Because of the lack of congressional
guidance, the courts in the nineteenth century fashioned their own
analytical framework to decide whether particular experimental
activities were subject to the bars. Important in these cases were
the patent law concepts of perfection, completion, and reduction to
practice. To understand experimental use and its relation to the
"on sale" and "public use" bars, one must first turn to these con-
cepts and the case law considering them.
The process of invention is not subject to precise definition.2"
Each inventor goes about the process in a unique manner.21 There
are, however, certain events which the courts have identified as
milestones in the inventive process.22
The inventive process, however parsed, begins with concep-
tion. Conception is "the formation in the mind of the inventor of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative inven-
tion as it is thereafter to be applied in practice."23 Conception is
the mental part of the inventive process.
The physical part of invention is reduction to practice.24 Ac-
tual reduction to practice25 is a legal conclusion 26 which can be
20 Nevertheless, authors have spent many pages trying to characterize invention. See,
e.g., J. HAYES, INVENTION (1942). No longer is this a fruitful endeavor, however, since the
1952 Act extinguished the once-favored requirement of "invention." See, e.g., Rich, Laying
the Ghost of the Invention Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26 (1972), reprinted in BUREAU OF
NAT'L AFF., NONOBVIOUSNEss-THE ULTMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:501 (J. Wither-
spoon ed. 1978) (invention is replaced by nonobviousness).
2! For an engaging personal account of the inventive process at its most unique, see N.
TESLA, MY INVENTIONs (1919).
22 A major difficulty in considering events in the inventive process is that no one knows
what the invention is-in a legal sense-until the claims of the patent directed to that in-
vention are written by the patent attorney and allowed by the Patent and Trademark Office.
Issuance of a patent can occur years, even decades, after the inventive process is complete.
See, e.g., Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (relating
continuing efforts of Gordon Gould, who invented laser in 1950's, to obtain patents for his
invention).
23 Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295, 4 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 269, 271 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
See generally 1 C. RmsE & A. CAESAR, INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 110-29 (1940).
2, See 1 C. RIVIsE & A. CAESAR, supra note 23, § 131; 1 W. ROBINSON, supra note 1, §
77.
2! There are two ways in which an invention may be reduced to practice. One is to file a
complete patent application disclosing the subject matter of the invention. This is known as
1988]
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considered to have four requirements:
(1) The invention must have been embodied in a physical or
tangible form;
(2) the physical embodiment relied on as a reduction must
show every feature of the invention as defined in the claim or
count in interference;
(3) the reduction to practice must demonstrate the practica-
bility or utility of the invention to those of ordifnary skill in the
art; and
(4) the reduction to practice must have been appreciated by
the inventor at the time it was made.27
The first and second requirements of a reduction to prac-
tice-a physical embodiment having each feature of the inven-
tion-are collectively referred to as the physical embodiment re-
quirement.2  The third and fourth requirements are often
"constructive reduction to practice." The focus of this Article is on the second way-actual
reduction to practice.
The Federal Circuit has emphasized that there is only one definition of actual reduction
to practice. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 655, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988); Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik
AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 838 n.6, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 567 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1984). That court does, however, have a different formulation of reduction to practice in
government contract inventor rights clause cases: "'Reduction to practice occurs when it is
established that the invention will perform its intended function beyond a probability of
failure.'" Hazeltine Corp. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1190, 1196, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1744,
1749 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 156, 161,
214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 860 (1982)). The "beyond a probability of failure" formulation was
articulated by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in an interference case. Taylor v.
Swingle, 136 F.2d 914, 917, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468, 471 (C.C.P.A. 1943). The apparent dif-
ference between the standards is merely semantic.
28 See Barmag, 731 F.2d at 837, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 566.
2 1 C. RivisE & A. CAEsAR, supra note 23, § 132. Rivise and Caesar assert that there are
seven requirements. Of these seven "requirements," only the third through sixth, those set
forth in the text above, relate to the event of reduction to practice. The first requirement,
that the reduction must have taken place in the United States, stems from 35 U.S.C. § 104
(1982), which precludes an applicant for patent or a patentee from relying on acts abroad to
establish a date of invention. A reduction to practice may occur abroad, but that reduction
to practice cannot be relied on to establish an invention date. The second requirement, that
the reduction must have been made by the inventor or by one authorized to do so either by
the inventor or by the inventor's assignee, goes to whether the applicant or patentee can use
the reduction to practice as evidence of his invention date, or whether that event inures to
the benefit of someone else. The seventh requirement, that the reduction to practice be
sufficiently corroborated in point of time, is evidentiary, stemming from the burden of proof
placed on one seeking to prove a date of invention earlier than the filing date.
28 Accord UMC Elecs., 816 F.2d at 651-52, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469; Correge v.
Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1329, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 755-56 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Farrand
Optical Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 328, 334, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1963);
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expressed by saying that an invention must be tested sufficiently
to demonstrate that it will work for its intended purpose.2" The
construction of this statement in the passive voice masks its two-
part nature: a subjective aspect directed to the inventor and an
objective aspect directed to a person of ordinary skill in the art °
Courts seldom find it necessary to analyze separately these latter
two requirements, as the subjective and objective appreciation of a
reduction to practice frequently coincide.
Because reduction to practice requires construction of a physi-
cal embodiment, the inventive process may be parsed as follows:
conception, construction of a physical embodiment, and actual re-
duction to practice.31 The inventive process ends at reduction to
practice, the invention being "complete" and "perfected."
Completion of an invention, as used in patent law, describes
that point in the development of an invention at which reduction
to practice is achieved. The corollary proposition, that completion
of an invention requires its reduction to practice, has been well
settled since the Supreme Court's nineteenth century "on sale"
and "public use" bar cases.2 Thus, by 1890, Professor Robinson
Henderson v. Gilpin, 39 App. D.C. 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1912).
29 Barmag, 731 F.2d at 838, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567; General Elec. Co. v. United
States, 654 F.2d 55, 62, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, 872 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam);
see Randolph v. Shoberg, 590 F.2d 923, 926, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647, 650 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
30 In order to establish actual reduction to practice, it must be shown that the inventor
appreciated or recognized the invention. See 3 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 10.06[4] (1986); 1 C.
Rrvs. & A. CAESAR, supra note 23, § 150; see also In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 720, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (dicta); Heard v. Burton, 333 F.2d 239, 243-44, 142
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 100 (C.C.P.A. 1964) ("recognition and appreciation" were lacking). Sim-
ply stated: "There cannot be a reduction to practice unless the inventor knows what he is
doing." Electro Metallurgical Co. v. Krupp Nirosta Co., 33 F. Supp. 324, 328, 45 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 541, 546 (D. Del. 1940), aff'd, 122 F.2d 314, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158 (3d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 699 (1942). Likewise, there can be no conception unless it was appre-
ciated by the inventor at the time it occurred. See 3 D. CHISUM, supra, § 10.04[6]; 1 C.
RVSE & A. CAESAR, supra note 23, § 117.
31 This three-step model can be used for heuristic purposes only. Invention can proceed
straight from conception to the filing of a patent application-a constructive reduction to
practice. An example of the latter process is where the inventor constructs no physical em-
bodiment, or constructs one that does not meet all the limitations of the patent claims.
2 See In re DeBaun, 687 F.2d 459, 463, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 933, 936 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("the law is well settled that a completed invention requires both conception and reduction
to practice"); Bogoslowsky v. Huse, 142 F.2d 75, 77, 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 349, 351 (C.C.P.A.
1944) ("[i]n the eyes of the law the invention is not completed until it has been reduced to
practice"); Hann v. Venetian Blind Corp., 111 F.2d 455, 458, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292, 296
(9th Cir. 1940); see also Note, New Guidelines for Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentabil-
ity, 24 STAN. L. REv. 730, 743 (1972) ("[a]n invention is completed when it is reduced to
practice because it then becomes useful").
1988]
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observed that reduction to practice is "necessary to complete the
inventive act,"3 3 and fixes the date of invention.3 4
"Perfection" of an invention, as the term is used in patent law,
also describes the state of development of an invention marked by
the event of reduction to practice.35 That the Court understood
these terms to be synonyms for an invention reduced to practice is
evidenced by arguments presented to it38 and the authorities on
which it relied in its early cases.3 ' These cases synonomously used
"perfection" and "completion" as the antithesis of experimenta-
tion, and used reduction to practice as the event that distinguished
between experimentation and the perfected or completed inven-
tion. This revelation is seemingly of minor practical value be-
33 1 W. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 125.
34 See id. § 132; see also Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 651, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 117,
120 (C.C.P.A. 1976) ("without an actual reduction to practice there is no invention in
existence").
35 See Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946,
949, 98 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4, 6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 873 (1953) ("An invention is
not made, developed or perfected until reduced to practice."); see also Automatic Weighing
Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 F. 288, 298-301 (1st Cir. 1909) (conception evi-
denced by disclosure, drawings, or model confers no rights upon inventor unless followed by
perfection, or invention, either by actual reduction to practice or by filing patent applica-
tion); 1 E. LipscomB, WALKER ON PATENTS § 3.11, at 215 (3d ed. 1984) (perfection is "con-
vert[ing] the mental idea to reality"); Schneider, The On Sale Statutory Bar, 56 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 619, 621 (1974) (invention is perfected when useful and serviceable).
3" See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 9 (1829) (arguments that sales of an
invention were made, "not to experiment with, in order to bring the invention to perfection;
but for public use, as a thing already completed").
11 The Supreme Court in City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97
U.S. 126 (1877), relied on Curtis' treatise on patent law. See G. CURTIs, LAW OF PATENTS 518
(4th ed. 1873). According to Curtis, perfection and completion are synonyms for a state of
development of an invention marking the end of experimentation. Curtis based his view
upon the circuit court case of Coffin v. Ogden, 5 F. Cas. 1195 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869) (No.
2,950), aff'd, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120 (1874), in which the court treated completion and
perfection as synonymous, both being the antithesis of experimentation. The Coffin court
additionally treated reduction to practice as the dividing line between experimentation on
the one hand and a completed and perfected invention on the other. See id. at 1199.
Although Professor Robinson did not use the "perfection" terminology extensively, he
did distinguish perfection of an invention from "mechanical perfection," and noted that
reduction to practice resulted in a perfected invention, but did not require "mechanical
perfection," i.e., a perfect embodiment of the invention. 1 W. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 129;
see Schneider, supra note 35, at 621. Compare The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888)
("The law does not require that a discoverer or inventor, in order to get a patent for a
process, must have succeeded in bringing his art to the highest degree of perfection.") with
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 552 (1871) ("it is well settled that until the
invention is so perfected and adapted to use it is not patentable under the patent laws").
See Comment, Experimentation and Public Use of Inventions-An Analysis of Ap-
pellate Anemia, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 585, 586-87.
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cause the term "completion" has largely fallen from use, reappear-
ing only in a few modern cases. 9 But the term "perfection" has
taken on a "new" meaning in patent law, one distinct from reduc-
tion to practice.4 0 The revelation that the Court used "completion"
and "perfection" to denote an invention reduced to practice is of
significant analytical value to the extent that it permits synthesis
of the early Supreme Court cases that initiated jurisprudential de-
velopment of the now section 102(b) bars.
III. THE EARLY SUPREME COURT CASES
Prior to the turn of this century, the Supreme Court devoted
substantial scholarship to developing "on sale" and "public use"
jurisprudence. Analysis of these early cases reveals three unifying
principles which, although frequently overlooked by the lower
courts in the years to follow, remain the basis of a valuable frame-
work for analyzing the "on sale" and "public use" bars.
A. Reduction to Practice Ends Experimental Use
The seminal experimental use case, and the logical starting
point for any discussion of the subject,41 is City of Elizabeth v.
American Nicholson Pavement Co.4 2 In that case, the inventor,
Nicholson, conceived a system for paving streets using wooden
blocks on a foundation of tarred paper. In order to test his con-
cept, he constructed a small patch of his pavement on a public
road near Boston. He tested the pavement-that is, he observed
the condition of the pavement resulting from the travel of heavily-
loaded wagons-for six years before applying for a patent on his
invention. He examined the condition of the pavement almost
daily and inquired as to the public opinion regarding its operation.
" See, e.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 622, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 639 (Fed. Cir.) (court used term "completed invention" in jury instruc-
tion), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985).
40 The term is often bandied about in interference cases in which one party is alleged to
have abandoned, suppressed, or concealed the invention before the other's reduction to
practice. See, e.g., Horwath v. Lee, 564 F.2d 948, 952, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 701, 705
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (" 'The law does not punish an inventor for attempting to perfect his pro-
cess [after reduction to practice] before he gives it to the public.'" (quoting Frey v. Wagner,
87 F.2d 212, 215, 32 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 242 (C.C.P.A. 1937))).
41 The statute contains nothing relating to experimental use and the legislative history
is unhelpful except in identifying the policies underlying the statute, which are discussed
infra at Part VI.
42 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
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In a suit for patent infringement, the accused infringer chal-
lenged the validity of the patent on the ground that Nicholson's
experiments constituted a barring public use. The Court com-
menced its analysis with the following observation:
The use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any other
person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to
bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as such
a use.
43
Implicit in this statement of the rule is a two-part test for experi-
mental use: first, the activity must be experimental in nature; and,
second, it must be undertaken to bring the invention to perfection.
After recounting the inventor's diligent observation of the con-
dition of his pavement and his lack of pecuniary gain from the use
of his pavement, the Court observed that the policy favoring the
inventor's prompt filing of a patent application is not implicated
"when the delay [in filing] is occasioned by a bona fide effort to
bring his invention to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will
answer the purpose intended. '44 The disjunctive construction of
this statement is inherently ambiguous. The Court may have
meant that in order for an activity to be considered experimental
its purpose must be either perfection of the invention or determin-
ing whether the invention will answer the purpose intended. More
likely, however, given the context, the Court simply used the dis-
junctive to display the two concepts, perfection of the invention
and determining whether it will answer the purpose intended,
synonymously.
The necessary implication of the foregoing passages from City
of Elizabeth is that the period of experimental use of the kind that
negates the bar ends upon "perfection" of the invention, and
"perfection" appears to have been equated with the appreciation
that the invention will answer the purpose intended. Under that
interpretation of City of Elizabeth, two requirements exist for an
experimental use to be of the type that will negate the "on sale" or
"public use" bars: first, the invention cannot have previously been
"perfected"; and, second, the activity must have been for the pur-
pose of experimentation, that is, bringing the invention to
perfection.45
43 Id. at 134.
44 Id. at 137.
4' Accord Root v. Third Ave. R.R., 146 U.S. 210, 222, 224-25 (1892); Koehring Co. v.
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The next Supreme Court "public use" case was Egbert v.
Lippmann.46 That case involved an inventor's loss of a right to a
patent on his corset springs by virtue of his allowing a friend, later
his wife, to use the springs in her corset for eleven years before
applying for a patent. En route to its conclusion that a "public
use" bar was created by the activities of the inventor, the Court
reasoned:
[The corset springs] were not presented for the purpose of experi-
ment, nor to test their qualities .... The invention was at the
time complete, and there is no evidence that it was afterwards
changed or improved....
... [T]he invention was completed and put to use in 1855.
The inventor slept on his rights for eleven years.4"
In rejecting the experimental use defense, the Court relied on two
grounds: the invention was complete, and the activities were not
for the purpose of experiment or to test the invention's qualities.
Thus, the Court adhered to the same substantive test as it applied
in City of Elizabeth, but replaced "perfected" with "complete."
The Court next applied the bar in Hall v. Macneale.5 In that
case, the Court refused to excuse activity as experimental, on the
same two grounds as it did in Egbert. The Hall Court focused on
whether the invention was "complete" and whether the activities
were "experimental." Within that framework, the Court held that
use of the patented mechanism in the interior of a safe, although
hidden from view, was a "public use."4
National Automatic Tool Co., 362 F.2d 100, 103, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 887, 890 (7th Cir.
1966); Ushakoff v. United States, 327 F.2d 669, 672, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 341, 343 (Ct. Cl.
1964).
48 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
17 Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
48 107 U.S. 90 (1882). The case was cited for this proposition in Root, 146 U.S. at 227.
4' See Hall, 107 U.S. at 96-97. The Court stated:
It is contended that the safes were experimental, and that the use was a use for
experiment. But we are of the opinion that this was not so, and that the case falls
within the principle laid down by this court in Coffin v. Ogden. The invention was
complete in those safes. It was capable of producing the results sought to be ac-
complished, though not as thoroughly as with the use of welded steel and iron
plates .... As to the use being experimental, it is not shown that any attempt was
made to see if the plates of the safes could be stripped off, and thus to prove
whether or not the conical bolts were efficient. The safes were sold, and, appar-
ently, no experiment and no experimental use were thought to be necessary. The
idea of a use for experiment was an afterthought. An invention of the kind might
be in use and no burglarious attempt be ever made to enter the safe, and it might
be said that the use of the invention was always experimental until the burglari-
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Finally, the Court considered the experimental use doctrine in
a case involving machinery for making shoe buckles in Smith &
Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague.50 The patent owner in that
case attempted to show that the use of his later-patented machine
to make and sell over seven million shoe buckles was merely exper-
imental, but the Court rejected this assertion and held the patent
invalid.51 In so doing, the Court resorted once again to the two-
part test of City of Elizabeth, stating that:
[T]he use of an invention by the inventor himself, or by another
person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to
bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded in this
court as such a public use as under the statute defeats his right to
a patent.2
By this statement the Court resurrected the form, as well as the
substance, of the City of Elizabeth formulation, using the term
"perfection" in a manner synonymous with its intermittent use of
"completion." 53
When read together, the Supreme Court cases addressing the
experimental use issue make clear the Court's view that the type of
experimental use which will negate the "on sale" and "public use"
bars is confined to tests and experiments for the purpose of
perfecting an incomplete invention."4 In the cases where the use or
commercialization was held to be experimental, and thus not a bar,
the invention was incomplete5 and the activity was for the pur-
ous attempt should be made, and so the use would never be other than experimen-
tal. But it is apparent that there was no experimental use in this case, either in-
tended or actual. The foregoing views... are in accordance with those announced
in Egbert v. Lippmann.
Id. (citations omitted).
50 123 U.S. 249 (1887).
" Id. at 266.
Id. at 257 (citing Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); City of Elizabeth v.
American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877)).
11 By citing Egbert ("complete") alongside City of Elizabeth ("perfection"), the Court
implied that the terms "perfection" and "completion" were synonymous. In its discussion of
the burden of proof on the experimental use issue, the Court in Smith & Griggs confirmed
that implication: "[W]here the defence is ... that the use was not a public use in the sense
of the statute, because it was for the purpose of perfecting an incomplete invention by tests
and experiments, the proof on the part of the patentee ... should be full, unequivocal, and
convincing." Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
" Accord National Biscuit Co. v. Crown Baking Co., 105 F.2d 422, 426, 42 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 214, 217-18 (1st Cir. 1939); Wendell v. American Laundry Mach. Co., 248 F. 698, 700
(3d Cir. 1918); Eastman v. Mayor of New York, 134 F. 844, 859 (2d Cir. 1904).
11 The most prominent case holding that the use was experimental is City of Elizabeth.
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pose of perfecting the invention. On the other hand, in those cases
where the use or commercialization was held to be a bar,5" the in-
vention was complete and the use or commercialization was not
experimental in nature.
The two prongs of the City of Elizabeth test, however, do not
always coincide. For example, in Worley v. Tobacco Co.,5 7 the
Court based its rejection of the patent owner's assertion of experi-
mental use solely on the holding that the invention was complete.
The Court noted that the inventor's use of his process for finishing
tobacco plugs was "experimental" in nature, but that it was di-
rected to features other than the claimed invention. 8 Thus, the
import of Worley is that completion of the invention ends the pe-
riod of experimental use that will negate the "on sale" or "public
use" bars.5"
Bearing in mind that completion is marked by reduction to
practice, and that the unifying theme running throughout the Su-
preme Court cases on experimental use is that experimental use
ends with completion, the inevitable conclusion is that reduction to
practice ends the period of experimental use of the kind that will
negate the "on sale" or "public use" bars.
Later cases and commentators have opined that the City of Elizabeth pavement invention
was perfected or completed when it was laid down. That view, however, equates perfection
and completion with mere construction of a physical embodiment. Contemporary usage sug-
gests that perfection and completion are established only by reduction to practice, or in the
words of the Supreme Court, by showing that the invention will answer the purpose in-
tended. The pavement in City of Elizabeth was not, of course, complete or perfected in this
sense of those terms.
The only other nineteenth century Supreme Court case upholding experimental use was
Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1887). Although the Court did not expressly state
that the invention was neither completed, perfected, nor reduced to practice, that conclu-
sion may fairly be implied.
" See Root v. Third Ave. R.R., 146 U.S. 210, 225-27 (1892); Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v.
Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 266 (1887); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Egbert v.
Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1881).
104 U.S. 340 (1881).
"Id. at 343. The Court stated:
[The inventor] testifies that [his invention] was complete, and he became satisfied
with its results, in 1871. It is true that after that date he made experiments to
decide upon the best mode of constructing his finishers so as to secure the requi-
site strength; but the finisher constituted no part of his patented invention. In
1871 his invention was complete, and in his opinion successful, and was adhered
to from that date, without change.
Id.
59 In another case, International Tooth Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U.S. 55 (1891), the
Court rejected an assertion of experimental use on the sole ground that the activities were
not experimental in nature. See id. at 62-63.
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B. Reduction to Practice is Not a Requirement of the Bars
A use or commercialization of an embodiment of a not-yet re-
duced to practice invention can be non-experimental in nature, i.e.,
for a purpose other than reducing the invention to practice. For
example, in City of Elizabeth, the inventor was performing tests to
satisfy himself that his pavement would work for its intended pur-
pose. Until he satisfied himself, the invention was not reduced to
practice and, hence, neither completed nor perfected. Nevertheless,
the Court cautioned:
So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to make it and use
it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he keeps the
invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a
patent.
But if the inventor allows his machine to be used by other
persons generally, either with or without compensation, or if it is,
with his consent, put on sale for such use, then it will be in public
use and on public sale, within the meaning of the law.
Had the city of Boston, or other parties, used the invention,
by laying down the pavement in other streets and places, with
Nicholson's consent and allowance, then, indeed, the invention it-
self would have been in public use, within the meaning of the law
60
The City of Elizabeth Court was adamant: "Any attempt to use
[the invention] for a profit, and not by way of experiment, for a
longer period than two years before the application, would deprive
the inventor of his right to a patent."'" The Court reiterated that
view in Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague,62 and Root
60 City of Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135-36.
6' Id. at 137.
62 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887).
A use by the inventor, for the purpose of testing the machine, in order by experi-
ment to devise additional means for perfecting the success of its operation, is ad-
missible; and where, as incident to such use, the product of its operation is dis-
posed of by sale, such profit from its use does not change its character; but where
the use is mainly for the purposes of trade and profit, and the experiment is
merely incidental to that, the principal and not the incident must give character
to the use. The thing implied as excepted out of the prohibition of the statute is a
use which may be properly characterized as substantially for purposes of experi-
ment. Where the substantial use is not for that purpose, but is otherwise public,
and for more than two years prior to the application, it comes within the
prohibition.
[Vol. 63:1
BARS TO PATENTABILITY
v. Third Avenue Railroad.6 3 But the most succinct explanation of
the rule that completion of an invention is not required for appli-
cation of the bars is found in a circuit court case, Lyman v. May-
pole,64 where it was stated that "when an inventor puts his incom-
plete or experimental device upon the market and sells it, as a
manufacturer, more than two years before he applies for his pat-
ent, he gives to the public the device in the condition or stage of
development in which he sells it.""5
Thus, as indicated by the Supreme Court in the previously
noted cases, completion, or reduction to practice, is not required to
invoke the bars. Rather, a pre-reduction to practice use or com-
mercialization of the invention for a purpose other than reducing
the invention to practice would be sufficient to invoke the bars.6
C. Experimental Use is Not an Exception to the Bars
In sum, the early Supreme Court cases portray an understand-
ing of the "public use" and "on sale" bars in which what is now
called reduction to practice played an important part. As soon as
the invention had been reduced to practice, its use could no longer
Id.
63 146 U.S. 210, 223-26 (1892).
19 F. 735 (C.C.N.D. IlM. 1884).
6 Id. at 736-37.
66 This is not to say that any profit, no matter how incidental, will prevent a pre-reduc-
tion to practice use or sale from being characterized as experimental. Some courts believe
that the activity has to be "solely" or "purely" experimental. See, e.g., Dart Indus. v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1366 & n.13, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 397 &
n.13 (7th Cir. 1973) (" 'public use' bar may be avoided by proof that the use was purely
experimental"), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974); Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d
407, 415, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1973) (prior uses not purely experimental
and therefore patent invalid), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Kent Indus., 409 F.2d 99, 100, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 322 (6th Cir. 1969) (defend-
ant has burden of proving activities solely experimental); National Biscuit Co. v. Crown
Baking Co., 105 F.2d 422, 426, 42 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 217 (1st Cir. 1939) (burden on plain-
tiff to show attempted use and sales merely to test invention). See generally Welch, Patent
Law's Ephemeral Experimental Use Doctrine: Judicial Lip Service to a Judicial Misnomer
or the Experimental Stage Doctrine, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 865, 875 (1980) (use not public use
if conducted only for "purposes naturally incident to testing").
In Smith & Griggs, however, the Court held that the use must be "substantially for
purposes of experiment" in order to be deemed experimental. 123 U.S. at 256. In other
words, there could be a profit motive, if merely "incidental." Id.; see also Zieg, Develop-
ments in the Law of "On Sale," 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 470, 501-02 (1976) (urging that the
Supreme Court resolve the apparent conflict). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
rejected the position that experimental use cannot involve any commercial exploitation in
In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1399 n.5, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 593, 597 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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be "experimental," and any public use or commercialization cre-
ated a bar. If the invention had not yet been reduced to practice,
any activity attended by a more than incidental profit motive cre-
ated a bar. Most importantly, if an activity was to be labeled "ex-
perimental," within the meaning of the doctrine, it must have been
performed for the purpose of reducing the invention to practice.
From this framework, three principles become evident. First,
application of the "on sale" or "public use" bars does not require
reduction to practice. Second, reduction to practice ends experi-
mental use. Third, experimental use is not an exception to the bar.
Rather, an activity is either a "public use" or "on sale" bar or it is
not depending on the intent motivating the activity, i.e., whether it
is performed for the purpose of reducing the invention to practice.
IV. THE LOWER COURTS
Just before the turn of the century, the Supreme Court began
taking fewer and fewer patent cases. 7 This effectively left the
lower federal courts as the final arbiter of patent disputes. These
courts strayed far from the analytical framework employed by the
Supreme Court in "public use" and "on sale" bar cases.
A. Experimental Use After Reduction to Practice
The effect of a reduction to practice is one aspect of the Su-
preme Court's analytical framework regarding which the lower
courts have been less than faithful to precedent. Although many
recent cases and commentators have hypothesized that in accord-
ance with the Supreme Court's view, reduction to practice ends the
period of experimentation which will negate the existence of a
"public use" or "on sale" bar," that view has not been unanimous,
67 In large part, this was due to the creation of the regional circuit courts of appeals in
1891 by the Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Before that Act was passed, patent
cases were tried in the circuit courts with mandatory review by the Supreme Court. After
the enactment, patent cases were tried in the district courts, with mandatory review by the
circuit courts and discretionary review by the Supreme Court. See Hantman, Doctrine of
Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 511, 537-38 (1988).
66 See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271, 279-85, 183
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65, 70-75 (5th Cir.) (legal definition of date of reduction to practice equates
precisely with end of experimental period), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1057 (1974); Nicholson v.
Carl W. Mullis Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 532, 535, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 13, 15-16 (4th Cir.)
(invention reduced to practice no longer in experimental phase), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828
(1963); National Biscuit, 105 F.2d at 425-26, 42 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 216-18 (same); American
Ballast Co. v. Davy Burnt Clay Ballast Co., 220 F. 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1915) (experimentation
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as several courts69 and commentators70 have taken the contrary
view.
Three cases often cited for the proposition that experimental
use can continue after reduction to practice are Aerovox Corp. v.
Polymet Manufacturing Corp.,71 General Motors Corp. v. Bendix
Aviation Corp.,72 and Atlas v. Eastern Air Lines.7 3 The Fifth Cir-
cuit reviewed these three cases and resolved, albeit temporarily,
the apparent split of authority over whether experimental use can
extend beyond reduction to practice in In re Yarn Processing Pat-
ent Validity Litigation.7 4 The Yarn Processing court recognized
the cases stating that experimental use can continue after reduc-
tion to practice,7 5 but harmonized them with the cases stating that
reduction to practice ends experimental use. The court started its
analysis by defining a four-phase model of the inventive process:
conception, construction of a physical embodiment, experimenta-
tion, and application for a patent. 6 After defining reduction to
after reduction to practice deemed merely incidental); Star Mfg. Co. v. Crescent Forge &
Shovel Co., 179 F. 856, 859 (7th Cir. 1910) (prior use before "perfection" experimental in
nature). See generally L. AmDUR, PATENT LAW AND PRACTicE 277 (1935); D. DUNNER, J.
GAMBRELL, M. ADELMAN, C. LiPsEY & B. LEWIS, PATENT LAW PERSPECTES § 2.3 [7.-2] (1988)
(discussing effect of reduction to practice on "public use" or "on sale" determinations);
Kayton, This Year (1966) in Patent Law, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 720, 726-28 (1967) (dis-
cussing circuit courts of appeals' treatment of experimental use exception to "public use"
bar).
60 See, e.g., Hunt Indus. v. Fibra Boats, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1145, 1150, 162 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 314, 318 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (use after reduction to practice may be experimental if
done as attempt to further refine device); Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 931, 934, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (same), afld, 356 F.2d
24, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966).
70 See, e.g., 2 D. CHIsum, supra note 30, § 6.0217][b][i], at 6-53 ("better and prevailing
view is that experimental use can indeed continue even after the invention has been com-
pleted and reduced to practice"); Pigott, The Concepts of Public Use and Sale, 49 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 399, 413, 415, 425 (1967) (period of experimentation can continue after reduction
to practice); Note, Public Use: The Inventor's Dilemma, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 297, 303
(1958) (experiments may continue after reduction to practice to further perfect device); cf.
Welch, supra note 66, at 875 (recognizing case law finding experimental use after reduction
to practice but suggesting this is wrong and should be changed by Congress).
71 67 F.2d 860, 20 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 119 (2d Cir. 1933) (dicta).
72 123 F. Supp. 506, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 58 (N.D. Ind. 1954).
73 311 F.2d 156, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4 (1st Cir. 1962) (dicta), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 904
(1963).
74 498 F.2d 271, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1057 (1974).
7. Id. at 281, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 72.
76 Id. at 275, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 67; cf. Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneu-
matic Scale Corp., 166 F. 288, 291 (1st Cir. 1909) (three-stage model: conception, applica-
tion, and patent, contrasted with four-stage model: conception, reduction to practice, appli-
cation, and patent); Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 583, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156,
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practice as ending the third phase, experimentation, the Fifth Cir-
cuit went on to harmonize the cases. The court explained that the
cases stating that experimental use extends beyond reduction to
practice used "reduction to practice" to mean construction of a
physical embodiment, what the court termed the "layman's"
definition:
[T]he legal definition of the date of reduction to practice appears
to equate it precisely with the end of the experimental period for
purposes of § 102(b).... The purpose of the experimental excep-
tion to § 102(b) is to allow the inventor sufficient time to perfect
his invention. An invention is "perfected" for purposes of patent-
ability once it has been reduced to practice by sufficient testing
and experimentation to demonstrate its utility. At that point,
then, further experimentation is not necessary before applying for
a patent, and it would seem that the experimental period should
end....
Numerous cases, however, have explicitly extended the ex-
perimental period past the point of reduction to practice....
This apparent conflict stems primarily from the differing def-
initions of "reduction to practice" being applied. The cases are in
substantial agreement that an inventor is permitted to experi-
ment on his invention after reducing it to reality (the end of
phase two of our model) without encountering the "on sale" or
"in public use" bars, so long as the experimentation is his pri-
mary objective and it is reasonably necessary for demonstrating
the device's utility and its lack of need for further refinement. By
saying this phase three experimentation occurs subsequent to the
"reduction to practice," the cases in the General Motors Corp. v.
Bendix Aviation Corp. line are merely using the lay definition of
the term, equating it with the end of phase two of our model.
Despite the differences in terminology, the result under either
line of cases is the same: an inventor is permitted a reasonable
amount of experimentation in phase three during which a placing
on sale or in public use will not bar the patent under § 102(b), so
long as the public use or sale is only incidental to the
experimentation.77
Yarn Processing notwithstanding, authority still exists for the
proposition that experimental use can extend beyond reduction to
167 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (three-phase model: conception, physical embodiment, and reduction to
practice).
7 498 F.2d at 280-82, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 71-72 (citation omitted).
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practice.78 Indeed, Professor Chisum correctly asserts that this pro-
position is the "prevailing view." 9 The position has been adopted,
at least impliedly, by the Second Circuit in Timely Products Corp.
v. Arron,80 and by a host of other courts presented with the issue
subsequent to Timely Products.
In Timely Products, the Second Circuit formulated a three-
part test for application of the "on sale" bar. The court stated the
second requirement as follows:
The invention must have been tested sufficiently to verify that it
is operable and commercially marketable. This is simply another
way of expressing the principle that an invention cannot be of-
fered for sale until it is completed, which requires not merely its
conception but its reduction to practice.81
The third Timely Products requirement was that "the sale must
be primarily for profit rather than for experimental purposes."82
The coexistence of these two requirements in the same test implies
that the Second Circuit thought that the period of experimental
use could extend beyond the date of reduction to practice. Other-
wise, the third requirement, "primarily for profit," would be
78 See, e.g., Kock v. Quaker Oats Co., 681 F.2d 649, 653-54, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 200,
204 (9th Cir. 1982) (dicta), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); Del Mar Eng'g Laboratories v.
Physio-Tronics, Inc., 642 F.2d 1167, 1169, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)
(dicta); Dragani v. Eastman Kodak Co., 576 F. Supp. 755, 764-65 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (dicta).
79 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 30, § 6.02[7][b][i].
80 523 F.2d 288, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (2d Cir. 1975).
81 Id. at 302, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 268. The first requirement was that "[tihe com-
plete invention claimed must have been embodied in or obvious in view of the thing offered
for sale." Id., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 267.
82 Id., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 268. This formulation of the relative amount of profit
motive in an experimental use differs from that espoused by the Federal Circuit. Despite
that court's frequent quotation of the Timely Products standard in reviewing cases in which
it has been applied, see, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), the Federal
Circuit cases use a different formulation; namely, whether the commercial exploitation, if
any, is "merely incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation to perfect the inven-
tion." Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona, Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1581, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833, 838
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d
831, 839, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135,
218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 793, 204 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 188, 194 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1400-01, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
593, 598-99 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
Both the Federal Circuit and Timely Products standards emanate from the Supreme
Court's ruling in Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1889).
The Federal Circuit standard seems to fall between the Timely Products standard and one
requiring that the activity be "solely" or "purely" experimental. See supra note 66.
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redundant.
Timely Products is important for two reasons. First, that it
was decided after Yarn Processing and cites that case as authority
for other propositions implies that the court recognized and re-
jected the Yarn Processing harmonization of the cases holding that
experimental use extends beyond the date of reduction to practice.
Second, the Timely Products test became widely accepted by dis-
trict courts as the test for determining application of the "on sale"
bar.
B. Reduction to Practice is a Requirement of the Bars
The lower courts early on strayed far from the Supreme
Court's analytical framework by instituting reduction to practice
as a prerequisite to creation of a "public use" or "on sale" bar. 3
Indeed, the regional circuits that considered the issue appear
unanimous in imposing the reduction to practice requirement . 4
These regional courts expressed a variety of reasons for adopting
the requirement. One rationale was that an invention could not be
placed "on sale" or in "public use" until it was an invention, i.e.,
reduced to practice.8 A second group of courts derived support
from legislative comments in the House and Senate Reports of the
1939 Patent Act for the conclusion that Congress mandated com-
pletion of the invention as a prerequisite of the bars. 6 Completion,
those courts recognized, requires reduction to practice.8 7 A third
group of courts simply followed the precedential path created by
" See, e.g., Henry v. Francestown Soap-Stone Co., 2 F. 78, 79 (C.C.D.N.H. 1880);
Draper v. Wattles, 7 F. Cas. 1061, 1063 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878) (No. 4,073); American Hide &
Leather Splitting & Dressing Mach. Co. v. American Tool & Mach. Co., 1 F. Cas. 647, 652,
655 (C.C.D. Mass. 1870) (No. 302).
"4 See Dataq, Inc. v. Tokheim Corp., 736 F.2d 601, 605, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 677, 680
(10th Cir. 1984); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 273-74, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1983); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701,
718, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521, 540 (1st Cir. 1981); Austin v. Marco Dental Prods., 560 F.2d
966, 970, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978);
CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 527 F.2d 95, 103, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 419, 425 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976).
11 See Dataq, 736 F.2d at 605, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 680; Poole v. Mossinghoff, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 506, 509 (D.D.C. 1982) (Chief Judge Markey, now of the Federal Circuit,
sitting by designation).
86 See, e.g., Stewart-Warner, 717 F.2d at 273, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1165 (citing Note,
supra note 32, at 732-35); Austin, 560 F.2d at 970, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 532.
"1 See Stewart-Warner, 717 F.2d at 273-74, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1165-66; Austin,
560 F.2d at 970, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 532.
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the first two, adding little, if any, analysis.""
Even though these courts instituted what they termed reduc-
tion to practice as a requirement for creation of the bars, they were
not very strict when it came to enforcing that requirement.8 9 As
the Federal Circuit was to later observe, "when faced with a spe-
cific factual situation which appeared to fall within the intent of
the statutory bar but did not technically satisfy the requirements
for reduction to practice, these courts . . .stepped back from a
rigid application of that requirement." 90 Nevertheless, the require-
ment of reduction to practice generally remained, and those ques-
tioning it were few and far between.91
C. Experimental Use is an Exception to the Bars
Thus, the lower federal courts employed a "public use" and
"on sale" framework vastly different from that developed by the
Supreme Court in its early cases. The Supreme Court treated re-
duction to practice as ending experimental use and viewed experi-
mental use as a pre-reduction to practice negation of the "public
use" and "on sale" bars. Under that view, the bars could apply
regardless of whether the invention was reduced to practice. The
lower courts, however, viewed reduction to practice as necessary
for creation of the bars and viewed experimental use as a post-
reduction to practice exception to application of the bars.
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
By 1982, there had developed two fundamentally different un-
See, e.g., Digital Equip., 653 F.2d at 718 & n.21, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 540 & n.21
(reduction to practice requirement "rooted in scientific reality and simple common sense");
CTS, 527 F.2d at 103, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 425; Henry v. Francestown Soap-Stone Co., 2
F. 78, 79 (C.C.D.N.H. 1880).
81 See, e.g., Red Cross Mfg. Corp. v. Toro Sales Co., 525 F.2d 1135, 1141, 188 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 241, 245-46 (7th Cir. 1975) (invention must be "essentially completed"); Dart Indus.
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1365, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 396 (7th
Cir. 1973) (reiterating "essentially completed" requirement), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933
(1974); see also Langsett v. Marmet Corp., 231 F. Supp. 759, 770, 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 903,
910-11 (W.D. Wis. 1964) (crude models and drawings sufficient development to invoke bar).
90 UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 655, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1470
(Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988).
91 See General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 60-61, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867,
872-73 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam); Colnan, A More Sophisticated Standard for
the "On Sale" Provision of Sec. 102(b), 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 674, 677-82 (1971); Kayton,
supra note 68, at 727-28; Note, The Public Use Bar to Patentability: Two New Approaches
to the Experimental Use Exception, 52 MINN. L. REV. 851, 868-69 (1968).
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derstandings of the "public use" and "on sale" bars. One group of
courts and commentators, including the Supreme Court, had con-
cluded that reduction to practice ends experimental use and is not
required for creation of the bars-that is, experimental use negates
the bars. The other group had concluded that reduction to practice
begins the period of potential experimental use and is required for
creation of the bars-that is, experimental use is an exception to
the bars. This split of authority will have to be resolved, if it has
not been already, by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
Judicially autonomous from the regional circuit courts of ap-
peals and the district courts, the Federal Circuit enjoys a unique
latitude within which it can permissibly fashion the law. That lati-
tude is restrained only by the decisions of the Supreme Court and
prior Federal Circuit panels, as well as the holdings of the Federal
Circuit's predecessor courts: the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, and the Court of Claims.92 Bearing these constraints in
mind, it is appropriate to review the Federal Circuit precedent.
A. Reduction to Practice is Not a Requirement for the "On
Sale" Bar
In a 1987 case, UMC Electronics Co. v. United States,93 the
Federal Circuit held that reduction to practice is not a require-
ment for creation of the "on sale" bar. 4 The court reviewed the
case law most often cited as establishing that reduction to practice
is a requirement for creation of an "on sale" bar,95 and concluded
that none of those cases, Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core &
Pad Co.,9" Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,97
or In re Dybel,98 held that creation of the "on sale" bar required
92 See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657,
657-58 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
.3 816 F.2d 647, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748
(1988).
9' Id. The court limited its holding to the "on sale" bar, cautioning that "[tihe public
use bar of section 102(b) implicates different considerations and nothing said here should be
construed to encompass that part of the statute." Id. at 652 n.5, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1468 n.6.
Id. at 654, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469-70.
' 782 F.2d 159, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
758 F.2d 613, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634 (Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 976
(1985).
'a 524 F.2d 1393, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 593 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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reduction to practice. The court stated that:
A full reading of the Dybel, Shatterproof Glass, and Great
Northern decisions makes it apparent that the parties did not
raise and the court did not squarely address the issue of whether
reduction to practice is an indispensable requirement of the on-
sale bar.... It, therefore, cannot be said that this court has taken
a definitive position either way on the issue we address here.9
In dissent, Judge Smith maintained that those same three
cases held that creation of the "on sale" bar required reduction to
practice. 100 Moreover, he relied on a handful of cases in which the
Federal Circuit had reviewed district court judgments which were
based upon an application of the three-step Timely Products
test.10 1 That test requires that for creation of the "on sale" bar the
invention must have been reduced to practice. 10 2
Despite the Federal Circuit's explicit adoption of some aspects
of the Timely Products analysis, the reduction to practice require-
ment was never among them. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals had reviewed a Patent Office Board of Appeals decision
using the Timely Products test, and stated broadly, "We agree
with these principles."' 0 3 However, wholesale adoption, outside of
dicta, had never occurred.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit anticipated its rejection of the re-
duction to practice requirements in Barmag Barmer Mas-
chinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.10 4 In Barmag, al-
though affirming a district court holding that a bar was created
under the Timely Products test, the court cautioned:
It is not difficult to conceive of a situation where, because com-
mercial benefits outside the allowed time have been great, the
technical requisite of Timely Products for a physical embodi-
ment, particularly for a simple product, would defeat the statu-
tory policy and we, therefore, do not adopt the Timely Products
UMC Elecs., 816 F.2d at 654, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470.0 Id. at 662-63, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476-77 (Smith, J., dissenting).
101 See, e.g., J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1580, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 435, 437 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986); King Instrument
Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 859-60, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach.,
Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836-37, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 565 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
102 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
103 In re Corcoran, 640 F.2d 1331, 1334, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, 870 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
10 731 F.2d 831, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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test as the answer in all cases.'05
Reduction to practice requires a physical embodiment. 06 Thus, the
Barmag court cautioned that in future cases it might not adhere to
the Timely Products reduction to practice requirement. Although
dicta, the Barmag statement served notice that the court had not
yet decided whether the "public use" and "on sale" bars required
reduction to practice, but that it intended to do so on the basis of
the policies underlying the bars, rather than by blind adherence to
the mechanical Timely Products approach. After expressing dis-
comfort with the reduction to practice requirement of the Timely
Products test in Barmag and other cases, 10 the court, in UMC
Electronics, rejected it outright with regard to the "on sale" bar.
In sum, the Federal Circuit has definitively held that an "on
sale" bar can arise without a reduction to practice. In doing so, the
court has eschewed blind adherence to regional circuit court prece-
dent of doubtful value, turning instead to Supreme Court prece-
dent and to the policies underlying the bar. Although the court has
given no indication whether creation of the "public use" bar re-
quires reduction to practice, one thing appears certain: the court
will answer that question by looking at those same policies.
B. Reduction to Practice and Experimental Use
In an early case, In re Josserand,08 the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals addressed the issue of whether reduction to prac-
tice ends the experimental use period. There the court concluded
that the invention had been reduced to practice, 09 but went on to
consider whether the use was experimental. The court reasoned:
[W]e must look to all the pertinent evidence in both proceedings
and determine therefrom whether such experimentation as was
carried on was engaged in for the purpose of perfecting the struc-
ture of the [claimed invention], or engaged in for the purpose of
experimentation as to what the public reaction to such an ar-
Id. at 837, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 565.
'o' See supra text accompanying note 28.
107 See, e.g., J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1580 n.4, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 435, 437 n.4 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986); King Instrument
Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Western Marine Elecs. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 337 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
108 188 F.2d 486, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 371 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
109 Id. at 490, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 375.
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rangement... would be. 10
The court concluded that the use was not of a nature that would
negate the bar, reasoning that "[t]he experimentation ... was in-
dulged to see if public patronage could be attracted-not for the
purpose of testing the structure."'11 Although the court also stated
that an experimental use period could extend beyond reduction to
practice of the claimed invention, it did not so hold.
The Federal Circuit's other predecessor, the Court of Claims,
had also visited this issue. In Gould Inc. v. United States,"2 a
Court of Claims trial judge rejected "[p]laintiff's arguments that a
reduction to practice can occur before an experimental use period
has been completed [as] unpersuasive and contrary to logic and
the law.""' 3 The trial judge held that the "on sale" bar applied by
virtue of offers for sale made after reduction to practice. On ap-
peal, the Court of Claims adopted the decision of the trial judge,"4
but modified it by deleting the "unpersuasive and contrary to logic
and law" language. " The court did not, however, alter the other
language in the trial judge's opinion confining experimental use
which will negate an "on sale" or "public use" bar to activities pre-
ceding reduction to practice:
After the invention has been built, the inventor (except... where
because of the simplicity of the invention or because of the cer-
tainty of the inventor that the invention can be manufactured
110 Id.
111 Id. at 494, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 378. The holding of Josserand demonstrates that
even at its most liberal treatment of experimental use, Federal Circuit precedent does not
equate market testing with experimental use. One commentator has suggested that market
testing of the claimed invention should fall within the experimental use doctrine because
such testing is beneficial to the consumer. See Note, The Validity of Patents After Market
Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 388
(1985). However, the premise that market testing is beneficial to the consumer does not
compel the conclusion that it should be deemed experimental use. Congress has already
given the inventor one year in which to conduct his market testing. Further, any reliance on
City of Elizabeth and TP Laboratories as examples of market testing equated with experi-
mental use is wholly misplaced. Both cases involved tests to determine the durability of the
claimed invention, tests required in those circumstances to arrive at a reduction to practice.
Neither involved market testing. Because market testing, if performed at all, usually follows
reduction to practice, the rule that reduction to practice ends experimental use would moot
the suggestion that experimental use be expanded to include market testing.
.12 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 112 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1977), modified, 579 F.2d 571, 198 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 156 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
113 Id. at 122.
114 579 F.2d 571, 571, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156, 157 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
15 Id. at 583, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 167.
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and sold as it currently exists) conducts tests needed to convince
himself that the invention is capable of performing its intended
purpose in its intended environment. This latter stage permits,
inter alia, the experimental use necessary to satisfy the inventor
of the merits of the invention. Then, and only then, [does] an
actual reduction to practice of the invention occur[]. 11
Rather than relying solely on the reasoning that reduction to
practice ended the experimental period, the Gould court addition-
ally considered the non-experimental nature of the patentee's ac-
tivities. 117 Thus, although one of the Gould court's holdings was
that reduction to practice ends experimental use, the court's dele-
tion of language from the trial court's opinion and its reliance on
other reasons blunted that holding.
Judge Nichols dissented vigorously in Gould. In his view, the
experiments were necessary to sell embodiments of the claimed in-
vention to the government. Because "[t]he time for commercial ex-
ploitation ...had not begun," he believed that the experimental
period continued past reduction to practice." 8 Claiming to derive
support from Yarn Processing,"9 Judge Nichols opined that "pub-
lic use or sale more than one year prior to the patent application
will be excused, even after the invention could be deemed reduced
to practice in the 'legal sense,' if experimentation is still going on
that is reasonably necessary 'to determine whether further refine-
ment is needed.' ",120
The jurisprudence inherited by the Federal Circuit regarding
the relationship between experimental use and reduction to prac-
tice, Josserand and Gould, points in opposite directions. Unfortu-
1 Id. The Gould majority relied heavily for support for its view that experimental use
ends upon reduction to practice on the Fifth Circuit's analysis in In re Yarn Processing
Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271, 280, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65, 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1057 (1974).
" Gould, 579 F.2d at 583, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 167.
Id. at 585, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 168 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
See id. (Nichols, J., dissenting). Judge Nichols' reliance on Yarn Processing was
limited to its citation of cases supporting the proposition that experimental use can extend
beyond reduction to practice. The Yarn Processing court harmonized those cases on the
ground that they equated reduction to practice "with the initial reduction of the invention
to reality," i.e., with the construction of a physical embodiment of the invention. See Yarn
Processing, 498 F.2d at 282, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 73. The Yarn Processing court held that
the experimental use period extended to reduction to practice, rejecting the argument that
experimental use ends once a physical embodiment of the invention is constructed. See id.
M Gould, 579 F.2d at 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 168 (Nichols, J., dissenting) (quoting
Yarn Processing, 498 F.2d at 285, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 75).
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nately, the court has never resolved the conflict.
In one of the Federal Circuit's early cases, In re Smith,12' the
court avoided an opportunity to address the issue of experimental
use after reduction to practice. In a discussion captioned "Appel-
lant's Arguments" the court stated:
In support of their arguments, the appellants cite Poole v. Mos-
singhof .... That court (Markey, C.J., sitting by designation)
stated:
There is a difference between the requirements of a re-
duction to practice and industry requirements for a com-
mercially practical device. There may be an experimental
use following reduction to practice as long as the experi-
ments are, as they were here, part of an attempt to fur-
ther refine the device.122
Although the court observed that it disagreed with appellant's ar-
guments, 23 it did not further address the issue of experimental use
after reduction to practice. Thus, although Smith appears to dis-
approve of the concept of experimental use after reduction to prac-
tice, it does not so hold.124
In the cases in which the Federal Circuit reviewed district
court applications of the Timely Products test, the court seemed to
assume that reduction to practice did not end experimental use.
Accordingly, the court occasionally looked to see whether the use
or commercialization was experimental after determining that the
invention had been reduced to practice.12 5 The court has also con-
sidered this issue in cases not involving the Timely Products
test.28 However, in none of these cases did the court hold, or af-
firm a holding, that a use or commercialization was experimental
22! 714 F.2d 1127, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
122 Id. at 1133-34, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 982 (quoting Poole v. Mossinghoff, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 506, 510 (D.D.C. 1982)).
223 Id. at 1134, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 982.
2'4 Strangely, at least one court has read Smith as establishing the proposition that
experimental use can continue after reduction to practice. See Moleculon Research Corp. v.
CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1420, 1425, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 598 (D. Del. 1984), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 793 F.2d 1261, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
25 See Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Maruta Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 839,
221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1 See, e.g., In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1108, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 988, 991 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Western Marine Elecs. v. Furano Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 846, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 334, 339 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 791-92, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
188, 192-93 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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even though the invention had been reduced to practice. 2 '
Both the majority and the dissent in UMC Electronics in-
dulged in an opportunity to discuss the experimental use after re-
duction to practice issue. The majority tempered its rejection of
reduction to practice as a requirement for application of the "on
sale" bar with the caveat that reduction to practice is still "an im-
portant analytical tool in an on-sale analysis": 2 s "A holding that
there has or has not been a reduction to practice of the claimed
invention before the critical date may well determine whether.., a
sale was primarily for an experimental purpose."' 29 Judge Smith
disagreed:
Even after an invention was reduced to practice in the interfer-
ence sense, courts [have] recognized that the invention still may
not have reached the stage at which a section 102(b) bar could
fairly attach: "The work of the inventor must be finished, physi-
cally as well as mentally. Nothing must be left for the inventive
genius of the public.. . ." The invention must be placed "into the
hands of the public in a condition for immediate use, requiring no
further speculation or experiment ... for the accomplishment of
its intended ends.' 130
More recently, in Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc.,31
the Federal Circuit appeared to have been presented with an op-
portunity to settle the issue. The plaintiff in a patent infringement
suit had previously averred in an interference proceeding that the
claimed invention had been reduced to practice well before the
critical date. Nevertheless, the plaintiff sought to excuse its pre-
critical date sales as experimental. The district court held that re-
duction to practice ended the period of experimental use as a mat-
ter of law. The Federal Circuit did not, however, reach the issue,
127 See supra note 126.
UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1471
(Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988).
129 Id.
230 Id. at 660-61, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (Smith, J., dissenting) (footnotes omit-
ted). The first quote is from Robinson's treatise. 1 W. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 127 (sec-
tion entitled "Reduction to Practice Must Demonstrate that the Idea of Means is Practi-
cally Useful"). That passage discusses reduction to practice, and was used in early cases as
the definition of reduction to practice. See, e.g., Sydeman v. Thoma, 32 App. D.C. 362, 372
(1909); Gallagher v. Hien, 25 App. D.C. 77, 82 (1905). The second quote is also from Robin-
son's treatise. 1 W. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 125 (section entitled "Reduction to Practice
Necessary to Complete the Inventive Act"). It, like the first quote, discusses reduction to
practice, not some further state of development necessary to trigger the bar.
131 828 F.2d 1558, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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due to its holding that the plaintiff's earlier admission of reduction
to practice was not binding.13
2
The conflicting statements of the Federal Circuit's predecessor
courts as well as its own continued avoidance of the issue suggest
that the issue of whether reduction to practice ends experimental
use is still very much alive. The court's reluctance to decide this
issue may stem from its recognition that rigid standards are espe-
cially unsuited to section 102(b) bars because "the policies under-
lying the bar[s], in effect, define [them]. ' 13 Although the court has
often expressed its antipathy to rigid standards in applying the
section 102(b) bars, perhaps no statement is as clear as that found
in an unpublished "on sale" and "public use" bar case, Ricon Corp.
v. Adaptive Driving Systems, Inc.:13 4
In none of our section 102(b) cases have we created a list of in-
cantations which the district court must utter to ward off reversal
on appeal. Certain circumstances may render any one or all of the
factors listed in our cases irrelevant in applying section 102(b).
Application of the on sale and public use bars of section 102(b)
presents "an infinite variety of legal problems wholly unsuited to
mechanically-applied, technical rules .... As a result, this court
has been careful to avoid erecting rigid standards for section
102(b)."... Instead, this court has consistently emphasized that
the totality of the circumstances must be considered in determin-
ing whether a particular event creates an on sale or public use
bar.135
Although it is entirely logical that if experimental use must be
for the purpose of reducing the invention to practice, then reduc-
tion to practice must end the period of experimental use, the
court's reluctance to so hold is understandable. Today's logical
holding may soon be regretted when the exceptional instance
arises. One fact, however, counsels for the court to endorse that
132 See id. at 1562, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212-13; see also ARNOLD, WHITE & DURKEE,
1988-89 PATENT LAW HANDBOOK § 1.01[2] (P. Brantley ed. 1988) (in Baker Oil, "Federal
Circuit neatly sidestepped issue of whether experimental use can continue after an inven-
tion has been reduced to practice"). Contra 2 D. CHisum, supra note 30, § 6.02[7][b][i]
(interpreting Baker Oil as holding that there can be experimental use after reduction to
practice).
"I Western Marine Elecs. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
334, 337 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1465, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
:34 No. 86-1352, slip op. (Fed. Cir. June .26, 1987).
11 Id., slip op. at 4-5.
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truism. The "on sale" and "public use" bar analyses are often con-
ducted with the date of reduction to practice already estab-
lished.13 16 Therefore, a significant event in the inventive process has
often been identified, an event which shall be shown to extinguish
any policies on which the patent owner could base a claim of ex-
perimental use. If the Federal Circuit is ever to decide the issue, it
is likely to return to the policies underlying the "on sale" and
"public use" bars, as it has done over and over again.
C. Experimental Use is Not an Exception to the Bars
In TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc.,3 '
the Federal Circuit rejected the proposition that experimental use
is an "exception" to the "public use" bar. The court returned to
the Supreme Court's seminal City of Elizabeth opinion and de-
cided that "if a use is experimental, . . . 'public use' is ne-
gated."' 3 8 The difference, the court observed, is not merely seman-
tic. Although the Federal Circuit focused on the resulting
allocation of burdens of proof, production, and persuasion, the dif-
ference goes much deeper. In eschewing the "exception" rationale
in favor of the "negation" rationale, the court turned from the re-
gional circuits' analysis back to that of the Supreme Court.
The Federal Circuit set out the skeletal structure of its "public
use" analysis in TP Laboratories:
[T]he court should ... look[] at all of the evidence put forth by
both parties and should ... decide[] whether the entirety of the
evidence .. .[leads] to the conclusion that there ha[s] been [a]
"public use." . . . [I]f a prima facie case is made of public use, the
patent owner must be able to point to or must come forward with
convincing evidence to counter that showing.139
The court identified the requirements for a prima facie case of the
"public use" bar in TP Laboratories40 and for a prima facie case
of the "on sale" bar in UMC Electronics,141 as a precritical date
131 See Nicholson v. Carl W. Mullis Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 532, 534, 137 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 13, 15 (4th Cir.) (date of reduction to practice admitted in rule 131 affidavit), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 828 (1963).
M' 724 F.2d 965, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
.38 Id. at 971, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 582.
139 Id. (footnote omitted).
140 See id. at 971-72, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 582-83.
I" See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,
1472 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988).
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use or commercialization of the claimed invention.142
Once a prima facie case of the "public use" or "on sale" bars
is established, one must turn to all the facts and circumstances.
Those facts and circumstances include: the length of the test pe-
riod, the number of tests conducted, and the relation between the
tests and those of other similar devices; whether payment was
made; whether the use, sale, or offer for sale was made subject to a
confidentiality agreement; whether records were kept; and whether
persons other than the inventor conducted the asserted
experiments. 14
3
After marshalling all the facts and circumstances, one must
analyze them in light of the policies underlying the bar. Although
the Federal Circuit has not articulated its policy weighing process,
it seems that implication of any one of the policies favoring the
public will sustain the bar absent the presence of a policy favoring
the inventor.1
4 4
This analytical framework makes no mention of reduction to
practice, either in the sense of the regional circuits, that reduction
to practice begins the period of applicability of the bars; or in the
sense of the Supreme Court, that experimental use is a use or com-
mercialization for the purpose of reducing the invention to prac-
tice. In TP Laboratories and UMC Electronics, the Federal Circuit
rejected the regional circuits' analytical framework. It remains to
be seen whether the Supreme Court's analytical framework will fit
within the Federal Circuit's policy approach. To determine
whether it will, we must turn to the policies themselves.
VI. THE PoLcms
In General Electric Co. v. United States,145 the Court of
Claims articulated a series of policies underlying the "on sale" and
"public use" bars: (1) the "policy against removing inventions from
the public which the public has justifiably come to believe are
142 In the case of a section 102(b)/103 bar, a prima facie case is established by a pre-
critical date use or commercialization of a device which would have rendered the claimed
invention obvious by its addition to the prior art.
143 See In re Brigance, 792 F.2d 1103, 1108, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 988, 991 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 553, 557 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971-72, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 582 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
144 See J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1583, 229 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 435, 439 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986).
-5 654 F.2d 55, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam).
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freely available to all as a consequence of prolonged sales activity";
(2) the "policy favoring prompt and widespread disclosure of new
inventions to the public"; (3) the policy against allowing the inven-
tor to commercially exploit "the exclusivity of his invention sub-
stantially beyond the statutorily authorized 17-year period"; and
(4) the policy allowing "the inventor a reasonable amount of time
following sales activity (set by statute as one year) to determine
whether a patent is a worthwhile investment. 14 6 The Federal Cir-
cuit has repeatedly turned to these policies in order to determine
whether a particular use or commercial activity raises an "on sale"
or "public use" bar.1 7 The court has also looked to these policies
in order to determine the validity of certain rules about when the
bars are triggered.'48
A. Policy to Avoid Detrimental Public Reliance
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the as-
surance that ideas once interjected into the public domain remain
there for public use. 49 Closely related to this objective is the no-
tion expressed by Congress in amending the "on sale" and "public
use" bars in 1939, that, as a result of pre-application disclosure of
an invention, "the public may ... come to believe that the inven-
tion is open to anyone.' 50 Thus, an inventor should be prohibited
from obtaining a patent after extended commercialization or pub-
lic disclosure of the invention has caused others to start making,
using, or selling it in the belief that the invention is freely available
146 Id. at 61, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 873.
14 See, e.g., UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1465, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988); J.A. LaPorte, 787 F.2d at
1583, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 439; King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Western
Marine Elecs. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 845, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 337 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 565 (Fed. Cir. 1984); TP Laboratories, 724 F.2d at 968, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 580.
18 See UMC Elecs., 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471-72; J.A. LaPorte, 787
F.2d at 1582, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 438-39.
14 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4
(1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 678
(1974); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 7 (1969).
1"I S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1939); see H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1939).
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to the public.151 Although patent applications are kept secret by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the public's rea-
sonable belief that an invention is available without restriction is
discouraged by the inventor marking the product with the mark
"Patent Pending.' 1 52 An inventor who fails to file an application,
and consequently fails to mark his product, theoretically leads the
public to believe that his invention is available for the public's
benefit.
In its early "on sale" and "public use" cases, the Supreme
Court often focused on the policy of avoiding detrimental public
reliance on pre-application disclosure. In Shaw v. Cooper,53 the
court eloquently addressed the subject of the inventor's responsi-
bility toward the public in this regard:
The patent law was designed for the public benefit, as well as
for the benefit of inventors. For a valuable invention, the public,
on the inventor's complying with certain conditions, give him, for
a limited period, the profits arising from the sale of the thing in-
vented. This holds out an inducement for the exercise of genius
and skill in making discoveries which may be useful to society,
and profitable to the discoverer. But it was not the intention of
this law, to take from the public, that of which they were fairly in
possession.
In the progress of society, the range of discoveries in the
mechanic arts, in science, and in all things which promote the
public convenience, as a matter of course, will be enlarged. This
results from the aggregation of mind, and the diversity of talents
and pursuits, which exist in every intelligent community. And it
would be extremely impolitic to retard or embarrass this advance,
by withdrawing from the public any useful invention or art, and
making it a subject of private monopoly....
No matter by what means an invention may be communi-
cated to the public, before a patent is obtained; any acquiescence
in the public use, by the inventor, will be an abandonment of his
right. If the right were asserted by him who fraudulently obtained
See Note, supra note 32, at 733.
"' Notice to the public that the invention is patented by marking the invention with
the word "Patented" and the number of the patent is encouraged by 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1982).
Using the mark "Patent Pending," however, has no statutory basis and no legal effect ex-
cept to subject the user of the mark to liability for false marking under 35 U.S.C. § 292(a)
(1982) if a patent application is not in fact pending. Nevertheless, that mark is commonly
employed to discourage potential infringers.
53 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833).
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it, perhaps no lapse of time could give it validity. But the public
stand in an entirely different relation to the inventor.
The invention passes into the possession of innocent persons,
who have no knowledge of the fraud, and at a considerable ex-
pense, perhaps, they appropriate it to their own use.'"
Similarly, in Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright,155 the
Court considered a case in which the inventor delayed filing his
patent application for eight years while the invention, a canning
jar, became widely used. The Court, in observing that "[l]arge
amounts of money must... have been invested in the business of
making and selling . . . [these] jars by various persons," '156 ex-
plained the policy against detrimental public reliance as follows:
He who is silent when he should speak must be silent when
he would speak, if he cannot do so without a violation of law and
injustice to others.
The supineness of the patentee is unexplained and inexcus-
able. A principle akin to the doctrine of equitable estoppel
applies.157
Likewise, in Egbert v. Lippmann,15 8 the court invalidated a patent
where "[t]he inventor slept on his rights for eleven years" and
"[i]n the mean time, the invention had found its way into general,
and almost universal, use. '159
These early cases involved proof of actual reliance by the pub-
lic on pre-application disclosures. The policy, however, applies to
pre-application disclosures, regardless of the existence of actual re-
liance. It is the mere possibility of detrimental reliance that must
be avoided. That possibility will always arise from an inventor's
use of an invention in a manner in which the invention is placed
beyond his control, or from use by another not under injunction of
secrecy to the inventor. Although not as clear-cut as these "public
use" situations, commercialization of the invention may also vio-
late the policy against detrimental public reliance to the extent
that the commercialization places the invention beyond the inven-
tor's control.
'" Id. at 320.
94 U.S. 92 (1876).
158 Id. at 95-96.
117 Id. at 96.
1-58 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
'59 Id. at 337; see also Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 709 (1888) (inventor waited five
years before filing application for patent during which time invention used by others).
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One form of pre-application use or commercialization that will
not implicate the policy against detrimental public reliance is
where the inventor discloses the invention to another under "in-
junction of secrecy. 1 60 In other words, pre-application disclosure
of an invention will implicate the policy unless, as recently phrased
by the Federal Circuit, the inventor had "'a legitimate expectation
of privacy and of confidentiality.' "161 Such a disclosure does not
place the "public" in possession of the invention.
It is often the case that a physical embodiment of an invention
provides an enabling disclosure of how to make and use the inven-
tion and that any disclosure of such an embodiment, whether by
commercialization or use, would convey the invention to the pub-
lic. But an invention need not be reduced to practice for its un-
restricted pre-application disclosure to cause detrimental public
reliance. The touchstone of reliance is disclosure, and the legalistic
notion of reduction to practice plays no role in determining
whether an invention is potentially disclosed.1 2 The member of
the public who understands and relies on a pre-reduction to prac-
tice disclosure cannot be denied protection solely because one of
the elements of reduction to practice has not been established.
The invention need not be embodied in a physical or tangible
form in order to provide an enabling disclosure. The inventor could
simply describe his invention as part of his commercialization or
disclosure.'63 All that is necessary for such a disclosure is a concep-
tion by the inventor.
The inventor need not be convinced that his invention will
work for its intended purpose in order to create public reliance on
his unrestricted pre-application disclosure. Rather, it is the poten-
tial perception of the members of the public who gain a sufficient
10 See Egbert, 104 U.S at 336; see also Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-
Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 906, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("public use"
under § 102(b) does not include use by person other than inventor who is under an "'obliga-
tion of secrecy to the inventor'" (quoting In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
161 Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
805, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting district court), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
12 The corollary of this principle is that an anticipatory prior art reference need only
be enabling, not reduced to practice. See In re Paramesuar Sivaramakrishnan, 673 F.2d
1383, 1384-85, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 441, 442 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855,
145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 554, 557 (C.C.P.A. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 973 (1966).
263 See Concrete Unlimited, Inc. v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537, 1538, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 784, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (placing design on file with public agency in connection
with construction project creates "public use" bar), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986).
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understanding that they might start making, using, or selling the
invention that dictates whether the possibility of detrimental reli-
ance will occur. Finally, the practicability or utility of the inven-
tion need not be demonstrated to those of ordinary skill in the art.
Those misled by the inventor's pre-application disclosure may be
of significantly higher skill in the art.
In short, the policy of avoiding detrimental public reliance is
triggered by any unrestricted pre-application use or commercializa-
tion which places the invention beyond the control of the inventor,
regardless of whether the invention is reduced to practice.
B. Policy Encouraging Early Patent Disclosures
"Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system.' 164
Publication of patents promotes the progress of useful arts by con-
tributing to the pool of public knowledge and stimulating further
invention. The earlier an inventor files his patent application, the
earlier the public will be able to obtain the information contained
therein. At least theoretically, however, the sooner an inventor is
compelled to file the application, the greater the possibility that its
disclosure will be defective. Congress has struck a balance between
the rights of the inventor and the public so that an inventor may
delay filing his patent application for no more than one year after
placing the invention on sale or in public use. Section 102(b)
"presents a sort of statute of limitations, formerly two years, now
one year, within which an inventor, even though he has made a
patentable invention, must act on penalty of loss of his right to
patent. '16 5
In the seminal case of Pennock v. Dialogue,6 6 the Supreme
Court explained the policy favoring early filing of patent applica-
tions as follows:
While one great object [of the patent laws] was, by holding out a
reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive
right to their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the ef-
forts of genius; the main object was "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts;" and this could be done best, by giving
the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the
164 W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303,
310 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
165 In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 987-88, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 173 (C.C.P.A. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966).
6 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
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thing invented, at as early a period as possible; having a due re-
gard to the rights of the inventor. 16
The policy encouraging early patent disclosures, which under-
lies both the "on sale" and "public use" bars, should not be con-
strued, however, to compel the inventor to rush to the Patent Of-
fice prematurely. Thus, this policy should only be triggered when
the inventor can satisfy the enabling disclosure requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112. This section requires that the inventor be able to
describe to one of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the
invention.
An inventor must have a conception of the invention to be
able to provide an enabling disclosure. However, it is irrelevant
whether the invention has been shown to one of ordinary skill in
the art to work for its intended purpose. Similarly, it is irrelevant
whether a physical embodiment of the invention has been con-
structed. Thus, implication of the policy favoring early filing of
patent applications does not require reduction to practice.
C. Policy Against Pre-Application Commercial Exploitation
The third policy underlying the "on sale" and "public use"
bars discourages the inventor's pre-application commercial ex-
ploitation of the invention. The Supreme Court has explained this
policy as follows:
If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowl-
edge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a
long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his
invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, relying
upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; and then,
and then only, when the danger of competition should force him
to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to take out a
patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use than
what should be derived under it during his fourteen years [the
statutory period in existence at the time]; it would materially re-
tard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a pre-
mium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their
discoveries.168
167 Id. at 19.
161 Id. In another early case, Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833), the Court
somewhat overstated the policy against pre-application commercial exploitation:
A term of fourteen years [now seventeen years] was deemed sufficient for the en-
joyment of an exclusive right of an invention by the inventor; but if he may delay
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The policy against pre-application commercial exploitation is,
simply stated, to "prevent the commercial exploitation of an inven-
tion as a trade secret for more than 1 year" 0 9 before filing a patent
application.
The commercial activity said to trigger the "on sale" bar is
often described as a "sale or offer to sell.' 170 Nevertheless, an ac-
tivity with a commercial purpose can implicate the policy against
commercialization and the "on sale" bar, without being a sale or
offer to sell in the contract sense.' 7 ' For example, in General Elec-
an application for his patent, at pleasure, although his invention be carried into
public use, he may extend the period beyond what the law intended to give him.
Id. at 322.
Strictly speaking, the period of an inventor's enjoyment of the exclusive right is set by
statute and cannot be extended. The Court later recognized this truism in City of Elizabeth
v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877):
It is sometimes said that an inventor acquires an undue advantage over the public
by delaying to take out a patent, inasmuch as he thereby preserves the monopoly
to himself for a longer period than is allowed by the policy of the law .... [In any
event, his] monopoly only continues for the allotted period ....
Id. at 137. Nevertheless, this concept of extension of the inventor's period of exclusivity
persists.
In General Electric Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867 (Ct. Cl.
1981) (en banc) (per curiam), the Court of Claims stated that an inventor must be pre-
vented "from commercially exploiting the exclusivity of his invention substantially beyond
the statutorily authorized 17-year period." Id. at 61, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 873. In King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), the Federal Circuit characterized the policy against com-
mercial exploitation as "prohibiting an extension of the period for exploiting the invention."
Id. at 860, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406. Similarly, in Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v.
Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (Fed. Cir. 1934), the court
stated that "[olne of the primary purposes of section 102(b) is to preclude commercial ex-
ploitation of an invention which has the effect of expanding the period of exclusive rights
granted by the statute." Id. at 836, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 565. None of these statements is
quite correct. An inventor may exploit his invention indefinitely. Pre-application commer-
cial exploitation in no way affects the period of an inventor's exploitation. Nor does pre-
application commercial exploitation allow the inventor to commercially exploit "the exclu-
sivity of his invention substantially beyond the statutorily authorized 17-year period." The
only true exclusivity involved is supplied by the statutory rights of the patent grant, the
term of which cannot be extended. However, it may be that, as a practical matter, pre-
application commercialization allows de facto exclusivity simply due to the inventor's lead
time in the marketplace, which can combine with the later 17-year de jure exclusivity for an
effective period of exclusivity exceeding that permitted by statute.
169 Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 580, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156, 164 (Ct. Cl.
1978).
171 See, e.g., Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1465, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1325, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
... An inventor's offer for sale of an article which embodies the claimed invention
doubtless invokes the policy. But the inventor's offer to sell his rights in the invention does
not. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1267, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
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tric Co. v. United States,"2 the trial court held that the "on sale"
bar applied to a government contractor who showed its invention
to representatives of the government even though that activity was
not an "offer" in the contract sense. The government representa-
tives had no authority to enter into a contract and the contractor
could not make an "offer" except in response to a government re-
quest for proposals.'7 3 Nevertheless, the activity was for a commer-
cial purpose: "to induce [the government] to accept the [claimed
invention] as [a] vital component of a flight control system which
GE was anxious to develop."""4
The policy against commercial exploitation applies to the
"public use" bar as well. A "public use" can be for commercial pur-
poses. 175 For example, the Supreme Court, in an early case, consid-
ered whether being paid to give lectures on an invention which was
not yet patented invoked the policy against commercial exploita-
tion and the public use bar. 6 The Court held that it did. 7 7
Any form of commercial exploitation by the inventor before
filing a patent application triggers the policy against pre-applica-
tion commercial exploitation. This is true regardless of whether
there has been any disclosure of the invention. 7 1
805, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987); Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Busi-
ness Forms, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1051, 1075, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 11, 29 (D. Del. 1984); Federal
Sign & Signal Corp. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1222, 1237, 177 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 737, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States Elec. Lighting Co. v. Consol. Elec. Light Co.,
33 F. 869, 970-71 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888). A more difficult case is presented when a non-manu-
facturer inventor licenses or offers to license his invention to manufacturers and distribu-
tors. Courts have struggled to distinguish that situation from an assignment. In Manufactur-
ing Research Corp. v. Graybar Electric Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 29 (11th Cir.
1982), the court held that an "on sale" bar arose from a sale of a prototype as part of an
offer to license a manufacturer. See id. at 1361-62, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 33-34. However,
in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1420, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595 (D.
Del. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 793 F.2d 1261, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987), the court distinguished Graybar and held that an
offer to license alone, without the sale of a prototype, would not trigger the "on sale" bar.
See id. at 1428, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 601.
172 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 260 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 55,
211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam).
173 Id. at 276.
174 Id. at 277.
175 See, e.g., In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (in-home testing of carpet deodorizer by consumers in order to gauge consumer inter-
est held to violate "public use" bar).
178 International Tooth Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U.S. 55 (1891).
177 Id. at 62.
178 See Note, supra note 32, at 734. In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Kent
Industries, 274 F. Supp. 993, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 211 (E.D. Mich. 1967), afl'd, 409 F.2d 99,
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Likewise, the policy against commercial exploitation may be
triggered regardless of whether the invention has been shown to be
one of ordinary skill to work for its intended purpose, and regard-
less of whether a physical embodiment of the invention has been
constructed. Accordingly, implication of the policy against pre-ap-
plication commercialization does not require reduction to practice.
D. Policies Favoring the Inventor
The statutory grace period is designed to promote the policy
of giving an inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales
activity to determine whether a patent is worthwhile. 17 9 In TP
Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc.,180 the Federal
Circuit identified an additional policy consideration favoring the
inventor: "[A]llowing an inventor time to perfect his invention, by
public testing .... ,111 Similarly, in City of Elizabeth, the Su-
preme Court observed that "it is the interest of the public, as well
as [the inventor], that the invention should be perfect and prop-
erly tested, before a patent is granted for it."' 82
The commentary that acted as the wellspring for the court's
policy analysis 183 extracted from this second policy favoring the in-
ventor a strict requirement: the invention must be fully completed
before any selling activity will raise a bar. That commentary con-
structed the completion "requirement" from snippets of legislative
history accompanying the act creating the "on sale" and "public
use" bars in 1836, as well as from the legislative history accompa-
nying the 1939 revisions to the statutory bars.
In the Senate Report accompanying the 1836 Act, Congress
recognized:
The first conceptions of ingenuity, like the first suggestions of sci-
161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321 (6th Cir. 1969), the court stated:
The policy behind [the "on sale" bar] is to prevent an inventor from holding back
the secrets of his invention, while at the same time exploiting them, and thereafter
applying for a limited monopoly when faced with competition, thus delaying the
time when the invention becomes freely available to the public.
Id. at 997, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 215.
I'9 See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (grace period allows inventor to determine if invention potentially
lucrative), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988).
180 724 F.2d 965, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
181 Id. at 968, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 580.
182 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1878).
181 See Note, supra note 32, at 735.
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ence, are theories which require something of experiment and
practical exemplification to perfect. Mechanical inventions are at
first necessarily crude and incomplete. Time is required to de-
velop their imperfections and to make the improvements neces-
sary to their adaptation to practical uses.""
Both the Senate and House reports to the 1939 Act also recognized
that "[t]he law... permits an inventor, after his invention is fully
completed, to make the invention known to the public for a period
of two years before filing his application for a patent. '185
Additionally, the commentary suggested that the public inter-
est favors encouraging the inventor to fie his patent application
only when the invention is complete.186 Such a premise is simply
wrong. As noted above, none of the policies favoring the public re-
quires that an invention be reduced to practice. There is no need
for the inventor to reduce his invention to practice before filing a
patent application. The considerations discussed by Congress in
the 1836 Senate report gave rise to the one-year grace period, and
did not establish a reduction to practice requirement for applica-
tion of the statutory bars. Nor did Congress enact a reduction to
practice requirement by its assessment of the case law in 1939.
In short, neither the legislative history of the "on sale" or
"public use" bars, nor the policies underlying the bars, establishes
a requirement that the invention be reduced to practice before the
bars can be triggered. It is undoubtedly in the public interest to
allow inventors time to reduce their inventions to practice before
applying for a patent. It is in furtherance of this interest that an
inventor's activities undertaken to reduce his invention to practice
are shielded from application of the bars. The mere absence, how-
ever, of a reduction to practice will not protect an inventor from
the bars if his activities are motivated by a desire other than to
reduce the invention to practice. Such activities do not further the
policy favoring giving the inventor time to reduce his invention to
practice. 87 The policy giving the inventor time to reduce his inven-
S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836).
185 S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1939).
181 See Note, supra note 32, at 735.
167 One issue involved in balancing the policy favoring allowing the inventor time to
reduce the invention to practice with that against pre-application commercialization is how
closely must an activity be tied to the furtherance of the policy favoring the inventor in
order to outweigh the policy favoring the public. For example, if an inventor sells an embod-
iment of an invention to another so that the other may use it and enable the invention's
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tion to practice is furthered only by activities undertaken to reduce
the invention to practice.
E. The Policy Balance
If any one of the policies favoring the public is implicated, the
relevant bar will attach unless countered by one of the policies
favoring the inventor.' Thus, any unrestricted pre-application use
in which the invention passes beyond the inventor's control, or any
pre-application commercialization of the invention, will raise a bar
unless the activity was undertaken less than a year before filing or
for the purpose of reducing the invention to practice.
If an activity implicates one of the policies favoring the public,
but was performed to reduce the invention to practice, it is deemed
an experimental use and the bars do not apply. Of course, once an
invention has been reduced to practice, a commercialization or use
of that invention can no longer be for the purpose of reducing it to
practice.
This is not to say that these principles answer every question
relating to the "on sale" and "public use" bars. Indeed some ques-
tions, such as whether reduction to practice should be a require-
ment for the "public use" bar, even though rejected in the "on
sale" context, as well as whether reduction to practice should be
required for application of the bars to activities of third parties
unrelated to the inventor, have lingered.
1. The On Sale/Public Use Dichotomy
Commentators, most notably Professor Kayton, have argued
reduction to practice, the sale is considered experimental as long as any profit motive is, at
most, merely incidental to the motive of reducing the invention to practice. What if the sale
was motivated solely by profit, but the profit was intended to be used, in whole or in part, to
fund experiments to reduce the invention to practice? At least one commentator is of the
view that the purpose behind the profit motive renders the activity experimental. See Note,
supra note 32, at 744-45.
A related problem occurs when the inventor seeks "developmental assistance." In Mar-
vin Glass & Associates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1089, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33
(S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 448 F.2d 60, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 263 (5th
Cir. 1971), an inventor's unsuccessful attempts to interest manufacturers in developing her
invention were held not to be barring commercial activities, but mere attempts to secure
developmental assistance. See id. at 1102, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 43-44.
188 See J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1583, 229 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 435, 439 (Fed. Cir.) (violation of single policy favoring early filing of patent applica-
tions sufficient to invoke "on sale" bar), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1986).
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that reduction to practice is a requirement for the "public use"
bar, but not the "on sale" bar.189 Indeed, the Federal Circuit ex-
pressly limited its UMC Electronics holding to the "on sale" bar,
cautioning that "the public use bar... implicates different consid-
erations."190 Professor Kayton reasons that an inventor who offers
his invention for sale should be estopped from arguing that it was
not then complete in order to avoid fraud on the buyer.191 On the
other hand, an inventor who has used his invention in public has
made no such representation. The "public use" bar, according to
Professor Kayton, only applies to "inventions" placed in public
use.
192
Professor Kayton's "plain language" analysis of the "public
use" bar applies equally to the "on sale" bar and provides no basis
for distinguishing between the two. Moreover, none of the policies
underlying the "on sale" bar are in any way furthered by estopping
an inventor by his representations or by preventing fraud on pur-
chasers. Finally, experimental "use" negates the "on sale" bar as
well as the "public use" bar.
Notwithstanding the analytical flaws in Professor Kayton's
theory, it raises an interesting point. An "on sale" bar situation
will always involve commercial activities and, thus, will always im-
plicate this policy against pre-application commercialization. On
the other hand, a public use may not. This is the primary differ-
ence between the two as far as the underlying policies are
concerned.
A public use, however, may be for commercial purposes, as
was demonstrated by the Federal Circuit's holding in In re
Smith. 93 More importantly, however, a public use may implicate
either of the other two policies favoring the public without impli-
cating any of the policies favoring the inventor-even though the
invention has not been reduced to practice. For example, the pub-
lic use of a device embodying what the inventor later reduces to
practice as his invention can trigger the policy against detrimental
public reliance. Because the policies underlying the "public use"
bar can be violated even though the invention has not been re-
19I. KAYToN, PATENTS 4-12--4-17 (1985).
110 UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.5, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,
1468 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988).
1 See I. KAYTON, supra note 189, at 4-15.
192 Id. at 4-14.
193 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
duced to practice, reduction to practice should not be a require-
ment for application of the "public use" bar.
2. Activities of an Unrelated Third Party
In many cases, activities of an unrelated third party are
treated the same as activities of the inventor. For example, in
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.,194 the Federal Circuit affirmed a find-
ing of "public use" even though based upon the secret commercial
testing of later-patented farm equipment by farmer-customers.
The policies against pre-application commercialization and detri-
mental public reliance, as well as those favoring early public disclo-
sure, were all violated. Likewise, a third party's secret sales or of-
fers for sale of the claimed invention are subject to the "on sale"
bar. However, this is so only because the policy against detrimental
public reliance is violated. 95
In other cases, an unrelated third party's activities are treated
differently from those of the inventor. For example, the Federal
Circuit has held an inventor's sale of a product secretly made by a
later-patented process subject to the "on sale" bar.'98 Although the
policies against pre-application commercialization and favoring
early disclosure are violated, the policy against detrimental public
reliance is not. Thus, the Federal Circuit has held that third party
sales of products secretly made by the subject process-to which
the policies against pre-application commercialization and favoring
early disclosure do not apply-do not raise either a "public use" or
"on sale" bar to the inventor's patent."97 To invoke either bar, the
activity of a third party must be capable of informing the public of
the later-claimed invention. That is, to raise either bar, a third
party's activities must place the invention beyond that third
party's control so as to violate the policy against detrimental pub-
194 741 F.2d 383, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004
(1985).
1'95 As the Federal Circuit explained in J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., the
purchaser or offeree is a member of the "public" who may detrimentally rely. See 787 F.2d
1577, 1583, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 435, 439 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884 (1987).
196 See D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147-48, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 13, 16 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto
Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54, 57 (2d Cir.) ("public use" bar), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946).
See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
303, 310 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28,
31, 46 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430, 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1940).
[Vol. 63:1
BARS TO PATENTABILITY
lic reliance.
Even during the period when the lower courts accepted reduc-
tion to practice as a requirement for application of the "on sale"
and "public use" bars, courts and commentators suggested that the
requirement was inapplicable when the bar was raised by third-
party activities.19 One post-UMC Electronics commentator, Rob-
ert Garrett, asserts just the opposite: that reduction to practice is
required only for application of the "on sale" bar to third party
activities. He agrees with the early cases and commentators that
third-party commercial activities do not frustrate the policies un-
derlying the "on sale" bar to the same degree as do the commercial
activities of the inventor because the policies favoring prompt dis-
closure and prohibiting pre-application commercialization by the
inventor do not apply.199 Garrett also recognizes that the policy of
avoiding detrimental public reliance may be violated regardless of
who performs the activity.200 He parts company with the case law
and commentators, however, in his view that "[t]he policy permit-
ting an inventor one year to test the commercial value of [his] in-
vention ...would ...not be frustrated."2 0'' The case law and
other commentators take the position that that policy is either not
served or inapplicable in the case of third party sales. 2
Garrett has identified an interesting question: do the bars ap-
ply to third-party activities which violate the policy against invit-
ing detrimental public reliance, even though the inventor was dili-
gently working towards reduction to practice? Although this
question has yet to be answered, its answer does not depend on
whether reduction to practice is a requirement of the bars. Rather,
it depends on whether one party's motives can shield it from a
statutory bar arising from the acts of another. Just as an inventor
cannot rely on the experimental motive of a third party to excuse
18 See General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 62 n.11, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
867, 874 n.11 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam); I. KAYroN, supra note 189, at 4-16.
Contra Pitlick, "On Sale" Activities of an Independent Third Party Inventor, Or-Whose
Widget Is It?, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 138, 155 (1982) (positing that policy against detrimental
public reliance not applicable unless invention reduced to practice because "it is reasonable
to require the public to make certain for itself whether the invention has been completed
before it may be protected under the detrimental reliance policy umbrella").
199 See Garrett, Comment: Reduction to Practice and the On Sale Bar, 69 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 581, 588-89 (1987).
200 See id. at 589.
201 See id.
202 See, e.g., General Elec., 654 F.2d at 62 n.11, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 874 n.11.
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otherwise barring activity,2 0 3 an inventor should not be able to re-
claim something dedicated to the public by someone else solely by
virtue of his own experimental intent. He is too late.
Applying the policies underlying the "on sale" and "public
use" bars, it is clear that application of neither bar requires reduc-
tion to practice and that reduction to practice ends experimental
use. Any experimental use negating the bars must be for the pur-
pose of reducing the invention to practice.
VII. THE TESTS
The policies underlying the bars may be synthesized to refine
the Federal Circuit's tests for their application. The following tests
incorporate the policies and the analytical framework established
by the early Supreme Court cases.
To apply the "public use" bar, one need only apply the follow-
ing test:
1. Whether the proponent of unpatentability or invalidity has es-
tablished that the invention was used so that it passed beyond
the user's control or was used by one to whom the inventor dis-
closed the invention without injunction of secrecy before the criti-
cal date. If not, the "public use" bar is not implicated. If so, a
prima facie case of the "public use" bar has been made out and
the applicability of the bar depends on the answer to a second
question.
2. Whether the proponent of patentability or validity has estab-
lished that the inventor performed the activity for the purpose of
reducing the invention to practice. If so, the "public use" bar does
not apply because the use was experimental. If not, the "public
use" bar applies.
To apply the "on sale" bar, one need only apply the following
test:
1. Whether the proponent of unpatentability or invalidity has es-
tablished that the inventor sold, offered for sale, or in any other
way commercialized the claimed invention before the critical
date, or that an unrelated third party sold, offered for sale, or in
any other way commercialized the claimed invention before the
critical date, so as to risk informing the public of the invention. If
"03 See Bourne v. Jones, 207 F.2d 173, 173, 98 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 205 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953). Contra Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 347, 117 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
68, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 63:1
BARS TO PATENTABILITY
not, the "on sale" bar is not implicated. If so, a prima facie case
of the "on sale" bar has been made out, and the applicability of
the bar depends on the answer to a second question.
2. Whether the proponent of patentability or validity has estab-
lished that the inventor performed the activity for the purpose of
reducing the invention to practice. If so, the "on sale" bar does
not apply because the activity was experimental. If not, the "on
sale" bar applies.
Of course, as with any "rule" derived as a compromise of com-
peting policies, these tests must be applied in light of all the facts
and circumstances of each case. This principle precludes applica-
tion of the rules in a mechanical fashion and leaves room for fac-
tual analysis in light of the relevant policies.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court in its nineteenth century
cases dealing with the "on sale" and "public use" bars applied a
simple analytical framework. Application of the "on sale" and
"public use" bars did not require that the invention be reduced to
practice. An activity would be spared application of the bars if its
purpose was experimental, i.e., for the purpose of reducing the in-
vention to practice. The experimental use negation of the bars en-
ded once the invention was reduced to practice.
After the Supreme Court stopped hearing cases dealing with
the "on sale" and "public use" bars, the regional circuit courts of
appeals and district courts strayed far from the Court's analytical
framework, instituting a bright-line reduction to practice require-
ment for application of the bars. These courts frequently spoke of
extending experimental use beyond reduction to practice, and
treated experimental use as an exception to, rather than a negation
of, the bars.
Soon after its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit began to
incrementally reject the regional circuits' approach. In 1984, the
court ceased treating experimental use as an exception to the bars;
and, in 1987, it rejected the notion that application of the "on
sale" bar required reduction to practice. As the Federal Circuit's
case law now stands, the court has diverged from the regional cir-
cuits' understanding of the bars, but has not yet fully embraced
that of the Supreme Court's nineteenth century holdings. To do so,
it would have to rule that reduction to practice is not required for
application of the "public use" bar, that reduction to practice ends
19881
50 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1
experimental use, and that experimental use is confined to activi-
ties for the purpose of reducing the invention to practice. The Fed-
eral Circuit has, thus far, avoided expressly adopting these pro-
positions, possibly because of its recognition that the bars are
unsuited to the application of mechanical rules. Nevertheless, the
policies underlying the bars establish these propositions as truisms.
Accepting these truisms, this Article has set forth refined ver-
sions of the Federal Circuit's tests for application of the "on sale"
and "public use" bars. These tests incorporate the analytical
framework of the Supreme Court cases as well as the policies un-
derlying the bars, the two wellsprings of the Federal Circuit's "on
sale" and "public use" analyses. Whenever questions of the "on
sale" and "public use" bars are now presented, whether to lawyers
or to courts, the factors of the problem lie before them, certain and
intelligible, requiring only careful distinctions and accurate reason-
ing to attain impregnable results.
